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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
YOSHITARO OKUDA and JACK 
ARAMAKI the sole heirs of KIM 
ARAMAKI OKUDA, deceased, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
JERRY A. ROSE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 8399 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was instituted by the Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, Y oshitaro Okuda and Jack Aramaki, as the 
sole heirs of Kim Aramaki Okuda, deceased, who died 
in an automobile-pedestrain accident on the 25th -day 
of October, 1953. Trial before a jury was had on June 
2nd, 1954, in the District Court for Salt Lake County. 
The jury returned a verdict against appellants, no cause 
of action. A motion for a new trial was duly filed by 
appellants. This appeal is prosecuted from the court's 
failure to grant the motion for a new trial. 
As will b8 not8d from the statement of facts and 
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from the record, there was no evidence produced in this 
case, either direct or circumstantial, as to the conduct of 
deceased prror to the impact with defendant's automobile. 
Appellants contend that the lower court committed re-
versible error in two particulars, namely, ( 1) the court 
instructed on the various ways in which decedent could 
be guilty of contributory negligence when that issue was 
not raised by the evidence, and (2) appellants duly re-
quested an instruction ·to the effe:ct that decedent was 
presumed to he in the exercise of due care which the 
court refused to give. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The auto-pedestrian accident which gave rise to this 
action occurred at approximately 2200 South Main Street 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 25th day of October, 
1953, at about 1 :30 A.M. 
The deceased, Mrs. Kim Aramaki Okuda, a lady of 
Japanese descent was a resident of I-Ielper, Utah. She 
had relatives and friends in Salt Lake City, including 
her son, one of the appellants, whom she visited on 
occasion. She did not speak English. On the evening 
that she met death, she had attended a Japanese movie 
shown at the Buddhist Church on West First South in 
Salt Lake City. After the movie she rode to Magna, 
Utah, with her sister, who lived in Magna, and her 
sister's son, Saige Aramaki. Saige Aramaki returned the 
decedent to Salt Lake City and let her out of his car 
on First South between West Temple and First West 
Streets. She was staying with friends in that neigh-
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borhood. Mrs. Okuda was not seen alive after that. 
The defendant, Jerry A. Rose, a resident of Cali-
fornia, but at the time of the accident a resident of 
Murray, Utah, was employed as a rate clerk by the 
Interstate Motor Lines. He worked irregular hours. On 
the Saturday preceding this accident, which occurred 
early Sunday morning, he had worked until about noon 
and then went home. Sometime during the afternoon 
he purchased a pint bottle of 86.4 proof whiskey. He 
and his wife drank about Jf2 of the bottle at horne during 
the afternoon and early evening. At approximately 9 :00 
P.M. the defendant and his wife left their horne in 
1\Iurray and came into Salt Lake City to the 11anhattan 
Club. They took the pint bottle of "\vhiskey with them 
and consumed the remainder of the contents at this 
night club. They remained there until it closed at 1 :00 
A.M. 
After leaving the night club, defendant Rose 
traveled south on Main Street to the intersection of 21st 
South ancl Nfain Street. l-Ie recalls stopping at that 
intersection in response to a red light. (R. 81). He 
was in the lane next to the shoulder of the road and 
stayed in that lane after leaving the intersection. (R. 81). 
The events subsequent to this are most graphically por-
trayed by the statement of defendant given the investi-
gating officer iinmediately after the aecident (Exhibit 
5) . It reads : 
"I was driving along south Main Street south 
of 21st South when son1ething hit my windshield 
immediately after a ear had passed n1e-It (the 
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object), chipped my windshield and I pulled to 
the right-I heard another dull sound and being 
in doubt as to what made the sound I stopped 
the car and got out to see what the trouble was 
-I noticed an object down the road and went to 
investigate-I found a woman and various articles 
on the road. The woman was injured and I stop-
ped the first car and instructed them to call 
Police and ambulance." 
/s/ Jerry A. Rose 
The body which he found was that of Mrs. Okuda, 
who died within a few moments thereafter. There were 
no eye-witnesses to the accident. Neither Mr. Rose, the 
defendant, nor his wife who was riding with him in the 
front seat, saw decedent before the impact. (R. 84, and 
125) 
The physical facts found at the scene were described 
by officers Jackson, Bowden and Vaughn of the South 
Salt Lake Police Department and Highway Patrolmen 
Nuttal and Cook. The South Salt Lake Officers were in 
charge of the investigation and were assisted by the 
Highway Patrolmen. (R. 41) 
Mrs. Okuda's body had not been moved [as testified 
by defendant (R. 86, 87) ] and was found by the officers 
about six feet from the sidewalk on the west shoulder of 
main Street. (Ex. 1) The shoulder of the road is ap-
proximately 15 wide and this would place the body about 
9 feet west of the travelled portion of roadway. (Ex. 
1). The body was 15 steps north of a sign marked 
"entering South Salt Lake." The Rose vehicle was 40 
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steps south of the body and it too was on the shoulder 
of the road* (see Ex. 1 vvhich is reproduced herein for 
reproduction betvveen pp. 5 & 6, reference). The vehicle 
was facing south vvith the front end at a slight angle 
tovvard the travelled portion of the roadway. (R. 54) 
Definite fabric marks were imprinted on the right 
front fender of the vehicle which matched the fabric 
of the coat worn by decedent. (R. 39) There was a small 
dent in the right front fender of the auto and the right 
front hear1light rirn vvas loose (Ex. 4). 
Again, the record contains no evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, as to the conduct or actions of decedent 
before the impact. Based on such absence of fact, 
defendant contended that decedent was guilty of con-
tributory negligence and the court instructed on the vari-
ous ways in which decedent could have been negligent. 
That the court erred in this part of its instructions is 
the substance of Point I of the argument of this brief. 
-x- It is to be noted that the defendant in his statement said 
that he found the body on the road. (Ex. 5). He testified that 
at no time did his vehicle leave the travelled portion of the road-
way and that he stopped on the paved portion of the roadway. 
(R. 102) The physical facts show to the contrary that both the 
body of Mrs. Okuda and the Rose vehicle were off the roadway 
and on the shoulder. Thus, plaintiffs contend, and the jury could 
have found, that Mr. Rose turned his vehicle from a travelled 
course on a roadway without first ascertaining that such move-
ment could be made with reasonable safety. Certainly, by failing 
to see decedent he was guilty of not maintaing a proper lookout. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION 
NO. 7 PERTAINING TO CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
POINT II 
THE CO,URT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAIN-
TIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO·. 2 PERTAINING 
TO THE PRESUMPTION THAT DECEDENT WAS, AT THE 
TIME OF THIS OCCURRENCE, PRESUMED TO BE IN 
THE EXERCISE OF DUE CARE. 
ARGUl\it:ENT 
POINT I 
THE CO·URT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION 
NO. 7 PERTAINING TO ·CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
The only established fact in this case relative to 
the conduct of deceased was that having been struck 
by defendant's vehicle she 'vas found about nine feet west 
of the travelled portion of the roadway, dying (Ex. 1). 
No one observed her n1ovements before the collision. 
Defendant admitted that he did not see her until after 
the impact (R. 84). 
From this state of the evidence the court nonethe-
less gave its instruction No. 7 pertaining to contributory 
negligence which plaintiffs duly excepted to (R. 140). 
The instruction reads : 
"Instruction No. 7. You are instructed that 
the deceased in the exercise of ordinary care, and 
in order not to be guilty herself of contributory 
negligence, was governed by the following rules 
of law at the time and place in question. 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. You are instructed that it was the duty 
of the deceased in undertaking to cross the high-
way, if you should believe that she was so doing, 
to keep a reasonable and adequate lookout for 
automobiles using the street and to use reasonable 
and ordinary care to keep out of the way of such 
automobiles. In this connection it was her duty to 
look and observe whether there were any auto-
mobiles in such close proximity as to affect her 
safety and to continue to keep such a reasonable 
and prudent lookout as was reasonably necessary 
for own protection. 
2. You are instructed that if you find from 
the evidence that the deceased was crossing the 
street at the time of the accident, or was commenc-
ing to cross the street and continued on, it was 
her duty to exercise ordinary care to ascertain 
her surroundings and the vehicles upon the high-
way at said time and not to ren1ain in a place of 
danger, or otherwise fail to exercise reasonable 
and ordinary care for her o'vn safety. 
3. You are instructed that a pedestrian cross-
ing a roadway at any point other than within a 
Inarked crosswalk or within an unmarked cross-
walk at an intersection should yield the right of 
way to all vehicles lawfully upon the highway. 
Therefore, it was the duty of said deceased to 
yield the right of way to vehicles upon the street 
if you find that she was crossing or commencing to 
cross the street under the above circumstances. 
4. You are instructed that it is unla,vful for 
any person to walk upon a road,vay where sic:e-
vvalks are provided adjacent to the highway. 
You are, therefore, instructed that if you find 
hy a preponoerance of the PvideneP that the de-
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ceased failed to observe any of the above rules 
of law respecting her conduct and that her failure 
proximately contributed to the happening of the 
collision then and in that event the plaintiffs 
herein would not be entitled to recover for her 
death." 
The Court has stated to the jury in effect that de-
cedent must have maintained a lookout for vehicles, 
which if she didn't would constitute negligence; that if 
they believed she was crossing the road, not within a 
crosswalk, she must yield the right of way and if they 
found she was walking along the roadway she must 
walk on the sidewalk if there was one. 
It is, of course, true, that the jury given facts of 
certain behavior may, in view of their own experience, 
conclude as a legitimate inference that such behavior 
did not amount to ordinary care. The inference, however, 
must be based on established fact. It cannot rest on con-
jecture and surmise. Under instruction No. 7 the jury 
was at liberty to find (1) that decedent failed to maintain 
a lookout, (2) failed to yield the right of way, and (3) 
was walking along the roadway where a sidewalk was 
provided and that by doing either of those three things 
she was guilty of negligence which would bar a recovery 
for her heirs. There is no element of fact in this case 
to establish any of the propositions. The jury at best 
could merely guess concerning decedent's conduct and 
thus the result they reached could not be based on logic 
or reason. 
They could have, however, been sufficiently im-
pressed with the instruction, to believe that there was 
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evidence in the record from which they could find that 
decedent was negligent. They could believe that there 
must have been this evidence in the record or the court 
would not have given the instruction. It is for these 
reasons that the courts have declared that such abstract 
instructions constitute reversible error. 
See Corpus Juris Secumdem, Trial, Sec. 379, Vol. 88. 
"Instructions should be concrete and specific 
as possible with respect to the facts and issues of 
the case, and not general or abstract, and it is 
improper to give an instruction announcing a 
naked legal proposition, however correct it may 
be, unless it bears on, and is connected with, the 
issues involved, and unless, further, there has 
been received some competent evidence to which 
the jury may apply it." 
This statement of the law is further amplified in 
succeeding sections in that volnme and is supported hy 
many cases. 
Jenson vs. S. H. Kress & Co., 49 P. 2d 968 (Utah). 
This was an action for personal injuries sustained 
by plaintiff when she somehow received a laceration in 
the abdomen caused by a piece of glass from one of the 
panels used by defendant on its show cases in its place 
of business. There was no evidence to show how the 
glass panel became cracked nor how long it had been in 
that condition. 
In discussing one of the lower court's instructions, 
the court said: 
"Instruction No. 8 reads: 'In determining 
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whether the defendant was negligent in maintain-
ing the show case, you may consider the question 
whether or not it was cracked or broken, and, if 
so, whether or not the defendant knew or by ex-
ercise of ordinary care should have known it was 
cracked or broken and whether or not the defend-
ant failed to give the plaintiff warning or notice 
of such condition; and all the circumstances in 
evidence, and from them you should determine 
whether or not the defendant was negligent." 
"The instruction was erroneous, not exactly 
on the ground argued by the defendant, but for 
the reason that there is no evidence that the de-
fendant was negligent. Therefore, it was im-
proper to predicate an instruction upon the 
theory that the jury might consider certain things 
to determine whether the defendant was negli-
gent." 
The case was reversed and remanded. 
Garrison vs. 11rowbridge, 177 P. 2d 464 (Mont.). 
This was an action for the death of a pedestrian 
which occurred at an intersection. After an adverse 
verdict the lower court granted a new trial to plaintiff. 
Defendant appealed thj s order. In affirming, the appel-
late court said in part: 
"Furthermore, the court erred in giving 
instruction No. 15 reading: 'You are instructed 
that all traffic, including pedestrians, must, when 
they approach an intersection of a city street in 
the City of Great Falls, and Second Avenue 
North, the same being a through street, stop and 
look before entering such intersection for the 
purpose of crossing the avenue.' To the giving of 
that instruction plaintiff objected upon the 
ground 'that there was a con1plete lack of a11y 
10 
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evidence in the case upon which the giving of such 
an instruction can be predicated.' The objection 
to the instruction should have been sustained. 
There was no evidence showing that deceased 
did not stop before entering the intersection. It 
is not proper to give an instruction on an issue 
concerning which there is no evidence. (53 Am. 
Jur. 455)" 
JYicCarthy vs. Pennsylvania R. Co., 156 Fed. 2nd 877 
(CCA 7th). 
This \vas a death action brought by the admini-
strator of the estate of deceased who was an engineer 
for defendant railroad company. Decedent was killed as 
a result of an engine turnover vvhen a journal box 
became over-heated. Judgn1ent for defendant and plain-
tiff appealed. The only issue before the court was 
Yvh2ther the trial court properly instructed the jury. 
In commenting on the instructions the appellate 
court said in part : 
"The court further instructed the jury: 'On 
the other hand (if you find) that the railroad com-
pany, knew at all times the things required of it 
by lavv, and that it did not violate the law requir-
ing the use of engines in safe condition, even if 
you find the Defendant was negligent and did not 
comply "\vith the lavv requiring the use of engines 
in good condition, hut that such failure to comply 
with the lavv was not the cause of the injury to 
and death of the decedent, but that such injury 
and death vvere caused solely by his own acts, in-
dependently of any negligence on the part of the 
Defendant, it would be your duty to find for the 
Defendant. But, I have stated, such acts of negli-
gence on the part of the Plaintiff, if yon find 
11 
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such acts of negligence, merely contributed to and 
were not the sole cause of his death, you should 
find for the Plaintiff.' ... Secondly, the instruc-
tion is improper because it told the jury that 
plaintiff could not recover if his decedent was 
guilty of acts of negligence that solely caused his 
death. As an abstract proposition of law, that is 
correct, but there was no evidence of any inde-
pendent acts of negligence by the decedent that 
were the sole cause of the accident and his death. 
The court had instructed on a proposition of law 
about which there was no evidence." 
The judgment was reversed and a new trial granted. 
The case of Olsen vs. W arwood, 255 P. 2d 725 (Utah) 
is distinguishable. This was an action for injuries to a 
minor child who was injured by the rear wheels of a 
school bus after the child had alighted from the bus. 
There was evidence that the bus had stopped; and that 
the driver had observed the minor plaintiff a good five 
feet from the bus before the vehicle was put back in 
motion. The court held that this evidence was sufficient 
for a jury to infer that plaintiff had walked or run 
toward the bus after disembarking and it was not error 
for the court to instruct in that regard. 
The court announces the general rule to be, however, 
as follows: 
"It is well settled in this jurisdiction that an 
instruction must be based on evidence, and that 
it is prejudicial error to submit a charged act 
of negligence to a jury for its consideration in 
the absence of evidence tending to support a 
finding that the act occurred. Smith vs. Clark, 
37 Utah 116, 106 P. 653, 26 L.R.A., N.S., 953, and 
12 
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see Griffin vs. Prudential Ins. Co., 102 Utah 563, 
133 P. 2d 333, 144 A.L.R. 1402; Kendall vs. Ford-
ham, 79 Utah 256, 9 P. 2d 183. Likewise it is well 
settled that the court may not permit the jury 
to speculate upon the evidence and that a finding 
of fact cannot be based upon surmise, conjecture, 
guess, or speculation. Jackson vs. Colston, 116 
Utah 205, 209 P. 2d 566; Dern Inv. Co. vs. Carbon 
County Land Co., 94 Utah 76, 75 P. 2d 660. 
The general proposition of law set forth in the 
Olsen case, supra, is applicable to the case at bar. Here, 
there is no evidence of decedent's conduct (as there was 
in the Olsen case) prior to the fatal collision. Yet, the 
jury was allowed to guess that decedent was crossing the 
street; that she did not maintain a proper lookout; that 
she failed to yield the right of "\vay. 
The error is doubly serious when one considers that 
the plaintiffs were deprived of the presumption of due 
care by the court's refusal to instruct on that point. 
That the court erred in instructing on the presump-
tion that deceased "\Vas in the c'xercise of due rare is the 
subject of Point II of this argument. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAIN-
TIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2 PERTAINING 
TO THE PRESUMPTION THAT DECEDENT WAS, AT THE 
TIME OF THIS OCCURRENCE, PRESUMED TO BE IN 
THE EXERCISE OF DUE CARE. 
As has heretofore been shown, there was no evidence 
produced at trial relative to the acts and conduct of 
deceased immediately before the impact. The only per-
13 
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son who had an opportunity to observe decedent (and 
negligently failed to do so), defendant, Jerry A. Rose, ad-
mitted that he did not see her before his vehicle struck 
her. There was no testimony to indicate where decedent 
was when struck. The physical evidence found was 
merely personal effects found near the body. There was 
no evidence of any scuff marks, skid marks or other signs 
of an impact on the travelled portion of the roadway. 
This absence of fact demands the giving of an in-
struction to the effect that decedent was presumed to 
have been in the exercise of due care. Appellants re-
quested such an instruction and duly excepted to the 
court's refusal to give it (R. 168 and 141). 
The problem thus raised in regard to the presump-
tion that a deceased person is presu1ned to have been 
exercising due care has been dealt with by the Utah 
Supreme Court in three recent cases. Tuttle vs. P.I.E ., 
242 P. 2d 764, Gibbs vs. Blue Cab, 249 P. 2d 213 and 
Mecham vs. Allen, 262 P. 2d 285. 
We conceive the doctrine of those cases to be that 
a deceased person is presumed to be in the exercise of 
due care (the presumed fact) which presumption arises 
from the fact that a person has been accidentally killed 
(the basic fact). The basic fact, of course, remains in the 
case. The presumed fact remains in the case until the 
party who has the burden of proving the non-existence 
of the presumed fact produces prima facie evidence to 
the contrary. If that burden is not discharged, the pre-
sumed fact remains in the case and the court should 
instruct the jury upon it. 
14 
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See Justice Wade's concurring opinion in the Gibbs 
case, supra, footnote 1, at page 217: 
"A presumption is merely a rule of law re-
quiring the trier of the facts to assume one fact 
from proof of another fact or set of facts. This 
kind of a presumption merely places on the dis-
favored party the burden of going forward \vith 
the evidence; it is completely nullified upon the 
production of prima facie evidence to the contrary. 
In the absence of such contrary evidence, the 
court should direct the jury to assume the pre-
sumed fact. The judge and not the jury deter-
mines when the evidence is sufficient and when 
he concludes that it is, he submits the issue of fact 
which would otherwise be presumed to the jury 
to be determined from the evidence along with 
the other facts without mentioning the presump-
tion." 
A somewhat similar rule has been developed by the 
court in California, beginning with JJI ar Shee vs. I~ a ry-
land Assurance Corporation, Baltimore, 210 P. 269, 
(Calif.). A later case stating and applying the rule 
of the Mar Shee case to a negligence action is West berg 
"' TV '7fl 94 p '),l ~90 "\ s. n z.. c e' . ._.q u. . 
"We think it well to state here that in our 
opinion there is a substantial difference in the 
situation before a court where the question of the 
plaintiff's negligence is in issue, and both plaintiff 
and his witnesses testified to all his acts and 
conduct at the time of his alleged negligence, fron1 
a situation \vhere the acts and conduct of a deced-
ent are the issues before the eourt. In the first 
instance, all possible facts both in favor of and 
against the alleged negligence of the plaintiff 
are before the eonrt, anrl it is difficult for us 
15 
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to preceive how any presumption as to his conduct 
can add to or detract from this evidence. Surely 
if this evidence conclusively supports the claiin 
that he was negligent, then, according to our 
decisions cited above, the presumption as to his 
conduct has been dispelled. On the other hand, 
if the plaintiff has testified respecting his acts 
and conduct, and his testimony and that of his 
witnesses showed that he used ordinary care 
for his safety, and instruction to that effect would 
not be of any assistance to him; but if such evi-
dence did not clearly and unmistakably clear him 
of the charge of negligence, then an instruction 
which would place his testimony in a more favor-
able light than it would be without such instruc-
tion would seem to be uncalled for, if not im-
proper. In such a case the giving of any instruc-
tion as to the presumption of plaintiff's conduct 
would seem to be of doubtful propiety. It has, 
however, been held that the giving of such an 
instruction under the circu1nstances just related 
was not prejudicial. (Citing cases.) But in the 
other situation, where the acts and conduct of a 
deceased person are the subject of inquiry, and 
the testimony respecting such acts and conduct 
necessarily must be produced by witnesses other 
than deceased, unless such testimony meets the 
requirement of the rule in the Mar Shee case, and 
other cases decided by this court folloWing the 
Mar Shee ease, an instruction that the deceased 
is presumed to have exercised ordinary care of 
his own concerns is not only proper but this court 
in an unbroken line of decisions, has sustained the 
giving of such an instruction." 
The precise question in this case is whether it can 
be said that prima facie evidence of contributory negli-
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gence was produced by defendant. The record is silent 
on the subject. There was no testimony on the subject 
of decedent's conduct and the physical facts found at 
the scene do not aid the defendant in establishing con-
tributory negligence, but rather, tend to indicate just 
the opposite. Can it be said then, that the court correctly 
found a prima facie case made out and correctly refused 
to instruct the jury on the presumption. The answer is 
no. The presumed fact remained in the case from be-
ginning to end and it was prejudicial error for the court 
to refuse to instruct the jury thereon. 
CONCLUSION 
The instruction on contributory negligence in this 
case gave the defendant the benefit of the doctrine 
without requiring him to produce evidence on this point. 
The jury could then speculate that decedent failed to 
maintain a proper lookout or that she was crossing 
the roadway and failed to yield the right of way or 
they could guess that she was not crossing the roadway 
but rather was walking along side the road in an area 
where sidewalks are provided which was a violation of 
law and would be negligence. The instruction was clearly 
error for this reason and plaintiffs' urge that upon a 
retrial of this case, unless evidence of contributory negli-
gence is produced, this issue, "\vhich is foreign to the 
evidence, be eliminated. 
Equally important is the court's failure to instruct 
the jury that deceased was presumed to be in the exercise 
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of due care. There was no evidence to the contrary and 
that being the case, the presumption remains in the case 
from beginning to end. It was error for the court to fail 
to instruct on it. 
For these two reasons, both of which are vital, plain-
tiffs urge the court to grant a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD M. GARRETT 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and 
App~ellants 
511 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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